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1. Introduction1 
Persuasive texts, such as public information brochures or advertisements, aim to 
convince their readers to behave in a certain manner, such as to stop smoking or to 
buy a new car. If argumentation is used to achieve this aim, these texts are 
generally characterised by pragmatic argumentation, a form of argumentation by 
which an action is recommended on the basis of its favourable consequences. In 
order to enhance the persuasive effectiveness of these texts, writers may choose to 
support their claims with different types of evidence, namely statistical, anecdotal, 
causal, or expert evidence. 
A few studies have been conducted to investigate the relative persuasiveness of 
these evidence types. The question as to what extent these evidence types occur in 
persuasive communication has hardly been explored. In the present article, a 
cross-cultural corpus study consisting of Dutch and French persuasive brochures 
will be presented. Two corpus studies were set up to investigate the relative 
occurrence of evidence types. Parts of the results have already been presented: 
study I in Hornikx, Starren and Hoeken (2003), study II in Hornikx (2003). The 
present article will partly discuss results of these studies, but the most important 
part will consist of a confrontation of both studies. The studies will be reanalysed 
with two different statistical methods.  
In the following section, the concept of evidence and a rationale for the 
classification of evidence types will be presented. Subsequently, the two corpus 
studies will be discussed. The article will end with a general conclusion and a 
discussion. 
 
                                                 
1  I am grateful to Hans Hoeken for his comments on a previous version of this article. I would also 
like to thank him, Marjan Groeneveld and Marianne Starren for their contributions to study II. 
2. Evidence 
Persuasive texts are written to convince their readers to behave in a certain way. 
They recommend, for instance, to purchase this type of broadband Internet or they 
stimulate to stop drinking brandy every day. From an argumentative point of view, 
these texts can be characterised by pragmatic argumentation, which is also called 
argumentation on the basis of advantages and disadvantages. Pragmatic 
argumentation is a form of causal argumentation, in which one reasons from cause 
to effect (Perelman/ Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). In its most simple form, the reasoning 
is as follows: action A leads to consequence C; consequence C is (un)desirable; 
therefore: action A is (un)desirable. In other words, there exists a ‘transfer of a 
given quality from the consequence to the cause’ (Perelman/ Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1969, 268). Eating fruits and vegetables, for instance, is good, because it reduces 
the risk of cancer. Pragmatic argumentation can be evaluated on the basis of two 
main questions (Feteris 2002): one about the normative judgment – is consequence 
C desirable? – and one about the empirical judgment – does action A lead to 
consequence C? (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Desirability and probability in pragmatic argumentation 
 
A text writer may anticipate both critical questions of a reader. He can choose to 
support the desirability of the consequence, and the probability that the action will 
indeed lead to the consequence. It seems that, in everyday persuasive 
communication, the desirability of the effects is only rarely supported by evidence. 
This goes for public discourse (Schellens/ de Jong 2000), and especially for 
advertising (Schellens/ Verhoeven 1994). The desirability of quick broadband 
Internet and the undesirability of feeling sick after drinking too much alcohol are 
self-evident. On the other hand, a reader will not readily accept the implicit claim 
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that the broadband Internet of this provider will be very quick or that the 
consumption of too much brandy will lead to a feeling of sickness. Therefore, 
evidence can be used to support the probability that an action will lead to certain 
consequences. Evidence can be defined as “data (facts or opinions) presented as 
proof for an assertion” (Reynolds/ Reynolds 2002, 429). If a text writer decides to 
support this probability, he can choose from a large range of evidence types. 
There exist many different typologies of evidence types. As Reynolds and 
Reynolds (2002, 437) put it, “Argumentation and persuasion scholars would be 
well-served by extended efforts at conceptualising and testing different 
classifications of evidence types”. Experimental studies, conducted to measure the 
relative persuasiveness of evidence types, have generally concentrated on three 
types of evidence: initially on source evidence (see review of McCroskey, 1969), 
and later on anecdotal and statistical evidence (see review of Reinard, 1988). 
There are a few reasons why causal evidence can be added to these three types of 
evidence. First, causal evidence is one important way by which people may judge 
the probability of a certain claim. In order to coherently interpret information to 
assess the likelihood of events or phenomena, people make, amongst others, use 
of cause-effects relationships (Ajzen 1977, Tversky/ Kahneman 1980). Second, a 
comparison of the most general argumentation schemes (Garssen 1997) with the 
three types of evidence leads to the observation that there is no counterpart of the 
argument by cause in the typology of evidence types. The introduction of causal 
evidence fills this gap. Third, Hoeken and Hustinx (2002) pointed out that there 
exists a striking analogy between these four types of evidence on the one hand, 
and the basic forms of scientific research on the other hand (the experiment, the 
survey, and the case study). The experiment is conducted to determine possible 
causal relations between factors, and therefore leads to causal evidence. The 
survey method is used to question a great number of subjects, and therefore results 
in statistical evidence. The last method, the case study, is qualitative in the sense 
that it aims to describe as detailed as possible a case or phenomenon (anecdotal 
evidence). The only type of evidence lacking in this analogy is expert evidence. 
There is no research method that leads to expert evidence, but the citation of 
sources in articles can be interpreted as a form of expert evidence. In order to 
define the types of evidence, we first have to discuss the function of evidence. 
When evidence is used to support a claim, we can speak of an argument. An 
argument is characterised by its argumentation scheme, the relation between a 
claim and an argument (evidence in this case). In the argument by generalisation, 
for instance, one reasons that something is the case in general (claim), because it 
is the case in this specific case (argument). In other words, “what is true of a 
sample from a class is also true for other members of the class” (Klopf/ McCroskey 
1969, 47). Figure 1 shows that, when selecting evidence to support a claim, a 
warrant, and therefore an argumentation scheme, is generated. A change in the 
type of evidence will inevitably entail a change in the type of argument. The 
question then arises why types of evidence are not just types of argument? In 
support of claims that actions will lead to certain consequences, evidence types are 
not identical to argument types. One reason is that anecdotal and statistical 
evidence can each be linked to two different types of argument, depending on the 
type of claim they support (see Hoeken/ Hornikx 2003). If the claim is general 
(related to all cases of a given situation), anecdotal evidence leads to the argument 
by generalisation. The evidence that John felt sick after drinking too much brandy 
might, for instance, support the claim that, in general, the consumption of too much 
brandy will lead to a feeling of sickness. If the claim is specific (related to only one 
case), then the same anecdotal evidence will lead to the argument by comparison 
(see table 1 below). Here, the same evidence that John felt sick after drinking too 
much brandy might now support the claim that Harry should not drink too much 
brandy, because it could make him feel sick. 
The definitions of the types of evidence will be given below. They are partly based 
on the definitions of Rieke and Sillars (1984). We will only concentrate on general 
claims, because specific claims are usually absent in persuasive communication. 
Each definition is followed by an example on the basis of the claim that drinking too 
much brandy will lead to a feeling of sickness. 
 
evidence type general claim  specific claim 
statistical generalisation  Classification 
anecdotal generalisation  Comparison 
causal  causal  Causal 
expert authority Authority 
Table 1: Evidence types and argumentation schemes per type of claim 
Statistical evidence is numerical information, based on a number of cases, that is 
used in relation to a claim about all the cases of the same class. An example is 
“Fifteen percent of the people who drink too much brandy experience a feeling of 
sickness”. Anecdotal evidence is the presentation of one case or a few cases that 
belong to the class mentioned in the claim it supports. An example is “At his 
daughter’s birthday party, Johan (53) drank about four glasses of brandy. The day 
after he felt a bit sick”. Causal evidence consists of one or more causes why the 
event in the claim it is related to will occur. An example of causal evidence is 
“Alcohol is absorbed into the blood and then affects the organ of balance and the 
brain”. Expert evidence is defined as factual information or opinions that are stated 
by an expert in relationship to the claim it supports. In this case, evidence could 
read, “According to alcohol abuse expert Dr. Brown, drinking too much brandy 
causes a feeling of sickness”. 
 
3. Corpus study 
In the remainder of this article, two corpus studies will be presented. We will first 
formulate the research questions (3.1) and describe the material (3.2). 
Subsequently, the procedure (3.3) and the analysis (3.4) will be explained. 
 
3.1 Research questions 
A number of experiments have been conducted to investigate the relative 
persuasiveness of evidence types (see for reviews, Baesler/ Burgoon 1994; 
Reinard 1988). There are hardly any studies that have examined the actual use of 
these types of evidence in persuasive communication. One of those studies is 
Levasseur and Dean (1996), in which the relation between the use of evidence in 
debates between presidential candidates and the outcome of these debates was 
examined. Based on the data they provide, one can calculate that statistical and 
anecdotal evidence is more frequently used than source evidence (experts and 
non-experts). Levasseur and Dean (1996) did not include causal evidence. Above, 
three reasons were given to add causal evidence to the other types of evidence. 
Next, studies that investigated the relative persuasiveness of evidence types have 
failed to examine the role of culture. There are indications, however, that culture 
may play a role. Nisbett et al. (2001), for instance, gave a detailed overview of 
differences in reasoning between what they call ancient Greek cultures (e.g., 
Europe) and ancient Chinese cultures (e.g., China, Japan). There may even exist 
differences in argumentation within one cultural group. We hypothesise that expert 
evidence will be more frequently used in French than in Dutch persuasive commu-
nication. A text writer who selects expert evidence to support the claim that an 
action will lead to a certain consequence has a presupposition. That is, in order to 
be convinced, the reader will have to accept that the expert possesses more 
knowledge about the topic in question. This case is characterised by a high power 
distance between the reader and the expert (Mulder et al. 1966). The degree to 
which differences in power distance are accepted proves to be culture-dependent 
(Hofstede 1991). A high power distance means that people accept the existing 
power distance; the lower the power distance, the less people accept differences in 
power distance (Hofstede 1991). France is in general characterised by a high 
power distance: it scored 68 on a scale of 0 (lowest power distance) to 100 (highest 
power distance) (Hofstede 1991). People in the Netherlands, on the contrary, 
generally have a relative low power distance: they scored 38 on the same power 
distance scale (Hofstede 1991). Therefore, expert evidence might be more 
frequently employed by French text writers than by Dutch text writers. 
 
Research question 1:  is expert evidence more frequently employed in French 
persuasive communication than in Dutch? 
 
Hornikx et al. (2003) showed that evidence to support the desirability of the 
consequences is more frequent in brochures with a public interest than in 
brochures with a direct personal interest. In brochures with a public interest, such 
as fundraising, a third party experiences the beneficial consequences of the 
proposed action. In brochures with a personal interest, such as these about alcohol 
consumption, those consequences are experienced by the reader himself. As both 
types of brochures differed in the occurrence of support for the desirability of 
consequences, they may also differ in the relative frequency with which evidence 
types are used to support the probability that an action leads to (un)favourable 
consequences. 
 
Research question 2: does reader interest in a brochure have an influence on 
the relative occurrence of the types of evidence? 
 
3.2 Material 
In order to test a cultural influence on the relative occurrence of evidence types in 
persuasive communication, two cross-cultural corpus studies with Dutch and 
French persuasive public information brochures were set up. Advertisements were 
not taken into account, because they often lack explicit verbal argumentation. 
Brochures were selected according to two conditions: they had to be freely 
available for all citizens, and they had to have a persuasive character. We will 
specify these two conditions below. 
In the Netherlands, it was quite easy to collect these brochures, because they are 
available in all public libraries and town halls. Brochures were selected in the public 
libraries and town halls of Amsterdam, Den Bosch, Nijmegen, and Veldhoven. In 
France, public information brochures are mainly distributed by the authorities that 
publish them; there are only a few institutions that offer a range of different 
brochures. By far the most important is the French Committee for Health Education 
(CFES) that belongs to the French Ministry of Health. We contacted several 
institutions, but only the CFES and the Local Hygiene and Health Service in 
Rennes sent a number of brochures. We then contacted 45 French fundraising 
institutions on the basis of an online database (www.yeba.org/annuaire), and an 
Internet company that groups the most important French fundraising institutions 
(www.aidez.org). 
Not all the collected brochures met the second condition: persuasiveness. A 
brochure was only considered persuasive, if pragmatic argumentation was the 
central argumentation scheme. That is, if a brochure presented some kind of 
behaviour with its (un)favourable consequences, we considered it a persuasive 
public information brochure, regardless of the style. It was striking how instructive 
many French brochures proved to be. In these brochures, the accent was not on 
the consequences of an action, but more on the ways in which the consequences 
might be achieved: first do this, then do that, etc. The goal of persuasive public 
information, nevertheless, is the same in the Netherlands as in France. In the 
Netherlands, this goal is defined as to change the reader’s attitude or behaviour in 
a direction proposed by the text writer (Koelen/ Martijn 1994). In France, the goal is 
to propose a change of mentality or behaviour that the citizen may adopt (Berthelot-
Guiet/ Ollivier-Yaniv 2001). 
The corpus of study I was collected between October 2001 and May 2002 and 
consisted of 123 Dutch and 79 French brochures of which only 30 Dutch and 20 
French proved to be persuasive. The brochures of the corpus in study II were 
collected between October 2001 and August 2002 and led to 140 Dutch and 100 
French brochures2. A number of brochures were also collected in Paris. Study II 
has two major improvements concerning its corpus. First, the number of brochures 
per group was kept equal (22 per country). Secondly, the number of brochures per 
                                                 
2 Both studies have a number of brochures in common. Together the corpora of studies I and II 
contain 94 brochures; there are 18 brochures that occur in each corpus. 
thematic category was identical over the two countries, because the topic of a 
brochure might influence the occurrence of certain types of evidence. A text writer 
of a brochure about road accidents, for instance, might have much statistical 
information about accidents, but might lack anecdotes. For this reason, the Dutch 
and the French corpora have the same number of brochures in the eight categories 
that were found: fundraising, alcohol, traffic, smoking, cancer, health, environment, 
and Developing Countries (see table 2 below).  
These categories were created on the basis of the available brochures. However, 
the number of available brochures per country varied over some categories. In 
order to obtain the largest number of brochures, some categories that were finally 
created are not mutually exclusive. A brochure in the category ‘cancer’ might of 
course also fall into the category ‘health’. Likewise, a ‘fundraising’ brochure is often 
a ‘Developing Countries’ brochure (but, as in the first example, the opposite is not 
true). This problem has no further consequences, as the goal of this categorisation 
is not to compare the relative occurrence of evidence types over the different 
thematic categories, but to control for the potential influence of the brochures’ topic 
on the occurrence of certain types of evidence in France and the Netherlands. 
 
category Netherlands (n = 22) France (n = 22) reader interest 
Developing Countries 8 8 public 
fundraising 5 5 public 
environment 1 1 public 
health 1 1 personal 
cancer 1 1 personal 
alcohol 1 1 personal 
smoking 2 2 personal 
traffic 3 3 personal 
Table 2: Number of brochures per thematic category in study II (N = 44) 
 
3.3 Procedure 
The persuasive information brochures were analysed using the grid of pragmatic 
argumentation. The procedure consisted of three stages: 1) determining the 
intended behaviour, 2) searching for the (un)favourable consequences, 3) seeking 
evidence in support of the probability that the behaviour will lead to the 
consequences. Only verbal arguments were taken into account, not visual 
arguments, such as an image of a person. A brochure may recommend one action 
or a series of actions. Likewise, the number of positive and negative consequences 
may vary from one brochure to another. Each instantiation of evidence was counted 
as one in the case of expert, anecdotal and statistical evidence. However, when 
causal evidence consisted of different causes why a consequence would occur, 
they were together considered as one instantiation of causal evidence. The 
presupposition here is that causes only form an explanation in combination. 
Concerning expert evidence, if a person has no superior knowledge regarding the 
topic, he is not considered an expert, but rather a source. Source evidence (a 
layman or an expert) can be used in combination with the other types of evidence, 
like anecdotal or causal evidence. This is even common in everyday persuasive 
communication: statistical evidence, for example, is “usually provided by reliable 
sources” (Brosius 2000, 19). Finally, there appear to be two types of expert 
evidence: an expert designated by name (“According to alcohol abuse expert Dr. 
Brown”), and an anonymous expert (“Studies show that”). This last category is not 
taken into account in the present studies, as no difference in power distance can 
occur: there is a reader on the one hand, but no other person on the other hand. 
In study I, the 50 brochures were analysed by one person. After an agreement 
between three persons about the exact procedure, the reliability was examined by 
analysing the brochures on two occasions (test-retest reliability). The second 
analysis only produced four modifications on the total of 127 instantiations of 
evidence. Subsequently, 14 doubtful cases were discussed by the three persons, 
which led to only three changes. In contrast to the first study, study II used multiple 
coders in order to come to a more reliable analysis. One person analysed all the 
brochures; three other coders each analysed a third of the brochures. The 
independent analyses of the coders were compared on the basis of two decisions 
that were made in each brochure: 1) is this really evidence?, 2) which type of 
evidence is it? Cohen’s κ was used to measure the intercoder reliability on both 
questions: to what degree did the coders agree on their analyses? For both 
questions, the intercoder reliability proved to be good, as κ was equal or superior to 
.80 (Neuendorf 2002). 
 
3.4 Analysis 
In study I, the corpus was analysed with χ2 tests, which is the most common way 
of statistical analysis in this type of research. The assumption of this method is that 
the observations (evidence) are independent. As cases of evidence sometimes 
occur in one single brochure, they may be dependent. A more correct way of 
analysis was used in study II: a 2 (country) x 4 (statistical, anecdotal, causal, expert 
evidence) analysis of variance. In this case, variance over the brochures is taken 
into account. Each brochure is considered a subject; country is a between-subjects 
factor, and type of evidence a within-subjects factor. This method enables one to 
analyse to what degree the types of evidence are used per brochure per country. 
Because this method is more conservative, there might be fewer significant results 
than with χ2 tests. In the present article, the data of studies I and II will be analysed 
with both methods, as the χ2 test is more common and the repeated measures 
MANOVA, the more correct one. 
In Hornikx et al. (2003), the evidence types in the corpus of study I were classified 
into the four types of evidence as presented in section 2. When combinations 
occurred, such as expert evidence with statistical evidence, these were considered 
both as expert evidence and as statistical evidence. In the current article, as in 
Hornikx (2002), combinations are seen as independent categories next to the other 
four types of evidence. In the results that will be presented in the following section, 
the four pure types of evidence will be emphasised. 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we will present the results of the analyses of the two corpora. We 
will first control to what degree both studies are comparable (4.1). We will then 
present the results according to the two research questions (4.2 – 4.3). Each time, 
we will discuss the results of study I (χ2 tests and analysis of variance), and those 
of study II (χ2 tests and analysis of variance). 
 
4.1 Comparison of study I and study II 
The corpus studies differ on two points: the corpus itself (the brochures in study II 
are balanced over thematic categories), and the procedure (the brochures in study 
II are each analysed by two independent coders). The results of study I and study II 
can be compared. If the occurrences of evidence types in both studies do not 
significantly differ, this would give more weight to the results. Moreover, this would 
imply that the analysis of corpus I – which was only analysed by one person – is 
more reliable than one could think on the basis of the lack of more judges. In fact, 
the relative occurrence of the four types of evidence in the Dutch and French 
brochures in study I does not differ from that in study II (χ2 = 4.39, df = 7, p = .73; 
F(3, 90) = 1.03, p = .38., η2 = .03). This shows that the relative occurrence of 
evidence types is more or less the same over the two corpora. This does not imply, 
however, that there will be no differences at all in the relative occurrence of 
evidence types in study I and study II, as we will see in the results. Nevertheless, if 
we compare the relative occurrences of the four main types of evidence in study I 
and study II, we can conclude that there are no significant differences between the 
two studies (see tables 3 and 4), which extends the generality of the results. 
 
4.2 Influence of culture 
The first research question was: is expert evidence more frequently employed in 
French persuasive communication? An analysis of the corpus of study I shows that 
expert evidence is used more in the French corpus (see tables 3 and 4; χ2 = 5.96, 
df = 1, p < .05; t(20.97) = 1.77, p < .05; one-tailed). The same results are partly 
obtained from study II (see tables 3 and 4; χ2 = 2.95, df = 1, p < .10; t(27.16) = 1.81, 
p < .05; one-tailed). 
 
 
 study I  study II 
 Dutch French total Dutch French  total 
St 16.13 34.43** 25.20 24.14  30.23 27.78 
An 4.84 22.95*** 13.82  6.90 29.07*** 20.14 
Ca 46.77*** 13.11 30.08  58.62*** 22.09  36.81 
Ex 1.61 9.84* 5.69 1.72  6.98 4.86 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
* <.05; ** < .01; *** < .001 
Table 3: Relative occurrence of evidence types in the Dutch and French brochures (in % per 
country; significant differences between countries are indicated; St = statistical, An = anecdotal, Ca 
= causal, Ex = expert) 
 
 
 study I  study II 
 Dutch French total Dutch French  total 
St 0.33 (0.99) 1.05 (1.64) 0.62 (1.32) 0.64 (1.26) 1.18 (1.37) 0.91 (1.33) 
An 0.10 (0.40) 0.70 (1.45) 0.34 (1.00) 0.18 (0.50) 1.14 (2.21) 0.66 (1.66) 
Ca 0.97 (1.71) 0.40 (0.60) 0.74 (1.40) 1.55 (1.97) 0.86 (1.13) 1.20 (1.62) 
Ex 0.03 (0.18) 0.30* (0.66) 0.14 (0.45) 0.05 (0.21) 0.27* (0.55) 0.16 (0.43) 
* <.05 
Table 4: Occurrence of evidence types per brochure in the Dutch and French corpus (SD between 
parentheses; significant differences between countries are indicated) 
 
There is also a small category of expert evidence in combination with causal, 
anecdotal and statistical evidence, which could be called expert+. Expert+ is more 
frequent in the French corpus with a χ2 test (study I: χ2 = 5.96, df = 1, p < .02; study 
II: χ2 = 4.77, df = 1, p < .05), but not with a t-test (study I: t(19.67) = 1.05, p = .31; 
study II: t(42) = 0.99, p = .33). 
More generally, there is a cultural difference in the relative occurrence of the four 
types of evidence. This goes for study I (χ2 = 42.17, df = 3, p < .001; F(2.42, 
115.90) = 3.37, p < .05, η2 = .07), as for study II (χ2 = 33.72, df = 3, p < .001; F(3, 
40) = 2.85, p < .05, η2 = .18). When we concentrate on statistical, anecdotal, or 
causal evidence, there are no cultural differences in the relative occurrence with t-
tests. However, with a χ2 test, there are significant differences: statistical evidence 
occurs more often in French corpus (study I: χ2 = 6.64, df = 1, p < .01), anecdotal 
evidence occurs more often in French corpus (study I: χ2 = 11.87, df = 1, p < .001; 
study II: χ2 = 12.66, df = 1, p < .001), and causal evidence is more frequently 
employed in the Dutch corpus (study I: χ2 = 18.83, df = 1, p < .001; study II: χ2 = 
18.80, df = 1, p < .001). 
 
4.3 Influence of reader interest 
The brochures in the corpora can be divided on the basis of the question whether 
the consequences of the proposed action will be experienced by the reader of the 
brochure or by a third party. We can distinguish between brochures with a public 
interest (such as fundraising and Developing Countries), and brochures with a 
direct personal interest (e.g., smoking or alcohol). The second research question 
was: does reader interest in a brochure have an influence on the relative 
occurrence of the types of evidence? (for the results, see tables 5 and 6). With an 
analysis of variance, there are no differences in the relative occurrence of the four 
types of evidence between the two types of interest (study I: F(3, 41) = 2.28, p = 
.09; study II: F(3, 38) < 1). When analysed with a χ2 test, reader interest does have 
an influence on the relative occurrence of the four evidence types (study I: χ2 = 
37.58, df = 3, p < .001; study II: χ2 = 13.13, df = 3, p < .01). More specifically, 
anecdotal evidence is used more in brochures with a public interest (study I: χ2 = 
15.73, df = 1, p < .001; study II: χ2 = 6.90, df = 1, p < .01), and statistical evidence 
more in brochures with a personal interest (study I: χ2 = 6.87, df = 1, p < .01; study 
II: χ2 = 9.30, df = 1, p < .01). 
 
 study I  study II 
 public personal total public  personal total 
st 16.33  34.92**  25.20  22.22  42.86** 27.78 
an 26.53*** 6.35 13.82  25.25**  9.52  20.14 
ca 24.49  38.10  30.08  36.36 40.48  36.81 
ex 14.29* 0.00  5.69 6.06  2.38 4.86 
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
* < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 
Table 5: Relative occurrence of evidence types in brochures with a public or personal interest (in % 
per interest; significant differences between countries are indicated) 
 
 study I  study II 
 public personal total public  personal total 
st 0.36 (0.95) 0.96 (1.66) 0.62 (1.32) 0.76 (1.24) 1.38 (1.50) 0.91 (1.33)
an 0.59 (1.22) 0.17 (0.83) 0.34 (1.00) 0.86 (1.88) 0.31 (1.11) 0.66 (1.66)
ca 0.55 (1.10) 1.04 (1.72) 0.74 (1.40) 1.24 (1.53) 1.31 (0.48) 1.20 (1.62)
ex 0.32 (0.65) 0.00 (0.00) 0.14 (0.45) 0.21 (0.49) 0.07 (0.28) 0.16 (0.43)
Table 6: Occurrence of evidence types per brochure in brochures with a public or personal interest 
(SD between parentheses) 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
Two corpus studies were set up to investigate whether a cultural influence on the 
relative occurrence of four types of evidence exists: statistical, anecdotal, causal, 
and expert evidence. Results indeed showed that there is a cultural influence on 
the relative occurrence of these evidence types (see overview in table 7). The 
hypothesis that expert evidence would be more frequently employed in French 
brochures was supported. 
The reader interest of a brochure did not affect the relative occurrence of 
evidence types, when the data were analysed with an analysis of variance. With a 
different statistical analysis, namely the less correct χ2 test (see section 3.4), reader 
interest did influence the relative occurrence. Brochures with a public interest, such 
as fundraising, contained more anecdotal evidence than brochures with a personal 
interest, which – in turn – had more statistical evidence. There is an explanation for 
this result. Anecdotal evidence, which is often quite vivid, might be useful in 
brochures with a public interest, because it enables readers to better understand 
the consequences of the proposed action. In brochures with a personal interest, a 
reader will be more able to judge the consequences and the action; in this case, it 
may be important to show that the consequence has occurred in numerous cases, 
and not just in one case. 
 
 χ2 MANOVA 
 study I study II  study I  study II 
cultural influence? yes yes yes yes 
expert more in France? yes yes no yes 
influence reader interest? yes yes no no 
Table 7: Overview of results depending on the method of analysis and the study 
In sum, we can conclude that the two corpus studies show that culture influences 
the relative occurrence of these types of evidence. This might mean that writers of 
persuasive texts from different cultures have other intuitions about which types of 
evidence might be more convincing than others. In order to assess whether these 
intuitions are correct, experiments should be conducted. In the experiment of 
Hoeken and Hustinx (2002), for instance, anecdotal evidence had relatively low 
persuasive power among their Dutch participants, which corresponds with the low 
occurrence of anecdotal evidence in Dutch brochures in the two corpus studies 
presented. However, expert evidence was rated as more persuasive than anecdotal 
evidence (Hoeken/ Hustinx 2002), whereas anecdotal evidence was more frequent 
than expert evidence in the Dutch corpus. These findings show the relevance of 
conducting experiments on the relative persuasiveness of types of evidence: 
evidence types that text writers prefer to use are not necessarily the most 
persuasive. Experimental research could investigate whether, for instance, Dutch 
readers appreciate causal evidence more than French readers or whether French 
respondents find expert evidence more effective than Dutch respondents. In this 
way, future experimental research could provide more insight into the relative 
persuasiveness of the different types of evidence. 
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